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TOWARD  rREE COMPETITION IN EUROPE 
f'be Bigb Jlulborily versus Cartels 
American observers of the European economic scene view eventual results of the High Authority's anti-trust policy as  one 
of the real tests of the Community's federal  powers.  It is  likely, during 1955,  that the executive body will initiate its  first 
concerted action  against  cartels  and  concentrations.  This report  deals  with the  High  Authority's powers  to  act  in  this 
field and with the situation in the Community as it exists today. 
The  President  of  the  High  Authority,  Jean  Monnet, 
frequently  has  described  the  Community's Treaty powers 
against  cartels  and  monopolies  as  "Europe's  first  major 
anti-trust  law".  These  powers  are  conferred  upon  the 
High  Authority  in  Articles  65  and  66  of  the  Treaty  in-
stituting the Community.  The most lengthy and detailed 
of  the  Treaty's  100  Articles,  they,  in  effect,  forbid  pro-
ducers'  agreements  that may  in  any  way  restrict  competi-
tion, but allow concentration of  industrial  strength if  the 
High  Authority  finds  that  such  concentration  does  not 
hamper the freedom of the market. 
In order  to  put teeth  into  the Community's  anti-trust 
policy,  the  Treaty  has  armed  the  High  Authority  with 
formidable  powers,  including  authority  to  penalize  firms 
taking part in  cartel action with fines  up to  10  per cent of 
their annual turn-over and at even higher rates  (up to  20 
per  cent  of  daily  turnover  in  the  case  of  daily  penalty 
payments)  for  shorter periods.  It can go  still further and 
break up a merger by  forced  sale  of its  assets.  These and 
other provisions  of  the Community's  anti-trust laws  have 
prompted  some  American  economists  to  observe  that 
these  measures  far  outweigh  the  punitive  powers  granted 
the United States Government's executive branch through 
the Sherman  and  the Clayton  Acts. 
Distinctions at Law 
In studying lines  of  policy  toward  trusts  as  laid down  by 
the Treaty,  it  is  important  to  note  the  distinction  made 
between  cartels  and concentrations. 
Cartels are  presumed  guilty until proven  innocent and 
therefore,  prima  facie,  forbidden.  Their  innocence  is 
something  that  the  High  Authority  alone  can  decide. 
The High Authority can  authorize them only if  they  lead 
to  a  substantial  increase  in  efficiency,  are  not  more  re-
strictive  than  is  necessary  to  their  immediate  purpose, 
and  do  not  confer  on  their  makers  power  to  prevent 
competition on  the common  market. 
Concentrations, on the other hand, are presumed inno-
cent  unless  the  High  Authority  finds  they  distort  the 
market.  Accordingly,  it must  authorize  them  unless  the 
newly-formed companies to which they give rise can restrict 
competition or establish themselves  in "an artificially priv-
ileged  position". 
There  is  good  reason  for  this  distinction.  Producers' 
agreements often, even usually, lead to restriction of  trade. 
But  technical  developments  generally  require  firms  to 
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organization of production.  Thus the concentration of in-
dustry  is  to  be  feared  only  when  it  leads  to  a  grouping 
which  commands  excessive  economic  power.  The  High 
Authority's  policy  is  to  encourage  concentrations  which 
lead  to  greater  efficiency  in  production  or  marketing and 
to lower  production costs. 
It is  important  here  to  note that where  the High  Au-
thority,  under  special  conditions,  decides  to  authorize 
producers'  agreements,  the  Treaty  empowers  it  to  set 
limitations  and  conditions  upon  such  authorizations. 
For  instance  it  may grant  them for  only a limited period 
with  periodic  renewals,  if  necessary,  and  it  may  im-
mediately revoke  or  modify an  authorization if through  a 
change  in  circumstances  the  agreement  no  longer  ful-
fills  the  conditions  under  which  High  Authority  author-
ization  was  made. 
Concentrations 
The  extent  of  industrial  concentration  in  Europe  today 
is  contrasted  sharply  with  the  massive  pre-war  combines 
that  once  controlled  the  lion's  share  of  the  continent's 
industrial production.  In the case  of Germany,  the Ruhr 
was  run  by  a  small  number  of  big  firms;  the  largest  of 
these, the Vcreinigte Stahlwerke, controlled over one third 
of  Germany's entire steel  output.  Through  the  Potsdam 
DEFINING  TERMS 
Few words in the international lexicon of economists are 
used  with  more  imprecision  than the words  cartel  and 
concentration.  Here  are  a  few  statements  and  defini-
tions  to help clear a semantic path to  the discussion of 
cartels and concentrations in  the accompanying article. 
A concentration occurs when separate firms  producing 
the same or complementary products come under single 
control.  The best example of concentration is a merger. 
The ability of a concentration to limit competition in 
the same  manner as  a  cartel  depends  upon  the size  of 
its  production  in  relation  to  the  total  output  on  the 
market or  alternatively  its  ability  to  seize  control  over 
access  to supplies or outlets for  goods. 
Cartels are  formed when separate companies engaged 
in  the  same  line  of  business  agree  to  follow  policies 
designed  to  limit  or  eliminate  competition.  Their 
restrictive  power  depends  not only  upon the extent of 
their control over the market but also upon their ability · 
to  control  the  actions  of  their  own  members.  (The 
term trust is  sometimes used  in distinction  to  cartel  as 
meaning  an  agreement  among  producers  to  restrict 
competition only within a  national market.) 
Beyond  a  certain  point,  concentrations  may  reduce 
the  number of  firms  producing the same  product to  a 
degree whereby they have, without agreement, the same 
effect as  a cartel or  reach  a point where cartels  may  be 
facilitated.  This latter  point  needs  careful  definition. 
Any effective policy to break up restrictive trade prac-
tices must prevent both cartels and concentrations from 
dominating the market.  But as  mentioned above,  one 
does  not necessarily  imply the other and care  must be 
taken  to  distinguish  between  the  effects  of  each. 
Agreement  of  194 5,  the  Allies  stepped  in  after  the  war 
with  stringent  deconcentration  measures  and  fragmented 
the  trusts-the only  major  ones  existing  in  the coal  and 
steel  industries  of  Western Europe. 
Thus when the High Authority took over  responsibility 
for  the  European coal  and steel  market, it found  a  situa-
tion where  even  the largest firms  were  of a  moderate size 
in relation to  the common market's total steel production 
capacity. 
Today, the largest firm  in  the Community, the ARBED 
combine of Luxembourg, with a production capacity of 2Yz 
million  metric  tons  a  year,  is  no  bigger  than  the largest 
British  firm  and  much  smaller  than  most  medium-sized 
American  steel  corporations.  Nothing  in  Europe  can 
compare  with  the  36  million  tons  a  year  of  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation  or  with  the  18  million  tons  ca-
pacity  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation.  No  Com 
munity firm  is  in a position  to control prices  on the com-
mon market because  of  its size. 
The New Face of the Ruhr 
In the  Ruhr,  the High Authority has  inherited the struc-
ture left by  the Allied  High  Command's deconcentration 
policy.  The pre-war economic concentration in  the Rulu 
had been partly a concentration of power,  capital, and in-
fluence  in the hands of small groups of people, and partly 
a  technical  concentration  of  coal  with  steel  comparable 
to  that of  iron  ore  with  steel  in  France. 
The Allied  policy  was  to  end  the  power  of  the  main 
shareholding families; to break up combines which, like the 
Vereinigte Stahlwerke, had a predominant position on  the 
market, and to  diminish the influence of  the banks. 
The  basic  plan  called  for  increasing  the  number  of 
Ruhr steel  companies from  12  to  28-thus reducing their 
control  over  Ruhr  coal  production  from  55  per  cent  to 
approximately  16  per cent of  total  production.  Allowing 
for  sufficient vertical integration to permit sound economic 
units,  Allied  policy at the same time did not permit com-
panies  to  retain  coal  and  other  raw  material  assets  ex-
tending further than their immediate needs. 
The holdings  of  the  great  families  were  partially  dis-
persed.  At  the  same  time,  the  influx  of  foreign  capital 
into the  Ruhr  since  the war-25  per  cent of  the  shares 
in  the  Ruhr  are  now  foreign-owned-has  limited  their 
influence. 
The Allies  have  divided  up  the  biggest  combines  and 
the most  important deconcentrations are  written  into  the 
German  basic  law  which  is  specifically  confirmed  by  the 
FJris  and  Bonn  Agreements  defining  Germany's  future 
status. 
Finally the Allies  sought to  ensure actual independence 
of  one  company  from  another  and  to  diminish  the  in-
fluence of the great banks which hitherto had automatically 
voted  for  small  shareholders  whose  stocks  were  deposited 
with  them.  Interlocking  directorates  were  prohibited  in 
company charters and all  shares in each company were  re-quired  to  be  registered  and  dividends  paid  only  to  the 
registered  shareholders. 
Allied  policy,  coupled  with  changes,  such  as  the grow-
ing influence of managers, which time has brought into the 
structure  of  the  industry,  has  profoundly  modified  the 
face  of the Ruhr.  The member states of the Community 
agreed  during  the  drafting  of  the. Treaty  that  after  the 
Allied  deconcentrations  in  the  Ruhr,  no  concentrations 
existed  in  the  six-nation  area  large  enough  to  endanger 
the common market. 
Three Regulations 
For this reason, the structure of  firms  formed  prior to the 
Community's  establishment  represents  the  point  of  de-
parture for  the High Authority which examines and passes 
upon concentrations occurring after  it was  set up. 
The  High  Authority's  criterion  is  an  economic  one-
whether or  not a  concentration  can  distort  the whole,  or 
an essential part of the common market.  It will  authorize 
concentrations in  the Rulu and elsewhere which are tech-
nically  sound  and  justified,  so  long  as  they  cannot  con-
siderably  reduce  competition. 
On May 6,  19 54,  the High Authority issued  three regu-
lations  required  by  the  Treaty,  which  outlines  its  policy 
on concentrations.* 
The  first  defines  the  elements  making  for  control  of 
an  enterprise.  The second  exempts  firms  forming  small 
combines  (of  Jess  than  about 40  per  cent  of  the  capac-
ity  of  the  biggest  present  steel  combines  of  the  Com-
munity)  from  the  requirement  of  receiving  formal  au-
thorization  from  the  High  Authority.  The  third  regu-
lation defines  the kind  of  information persons  and enter-
prises  outside  the  High  Authority's  jurisdiction  must 
furnish  to  the executive body. 
These regulations outline policy only very  generally.  As 
every  case  of  concentration  presents  particular  aspects 
of its own, it would not have been wise to fix  too dogmatic-
Jlly  or  soon  the  line  between  which  concentrations  will 
be  authorized  or  refused. 
To cite a simple example of  the complexities  involved: 
a  firm  with  a  capacity  of  two  million  tons  producing  all 
kinds  of  steel  will  probably  not distort the  market.  But 
another,  producing  one  million  tons  of  one  kind  of  steel 
only,  might  quickly  seize  a  domimint  position  on  the 
market for  that particular steel. 
The High  Authority has  decided  it  is  preferable  to  de-
velop a kind of "case law"  on concentrations, based  upon 
the  study  of  particular  requests  for  authorizations.  Its 
policy will  thus  grow  out of  study of  specific  cases  rather 
than stand on general judgments.  This is  more akin to  the 
British and American legal approach than to the traditional 
European view. 
* These  decisions  are  found  in  the  "Journal  Officiel"  of  the 
Community,  Vol.  III,  Nos.  9  and  11,  dated  11  and  31  May, 
1954;  a  resume  is  to  be found  in  the High Authority's  report  to 
the  Assembly  on  the  Sitnatio:1  of  the  Community,  dated  Nov., 
1954,  pp.  102-3  in  the English  edition. 
The Trend Toward Greater 
Concentration 
So  far  the High Authority has looked into 14 cases of con-
centrations and agreed  to  seven  in  France, Germany, Bel-
gium,  and  Luxembourg.*  The  other  seven  are  under 
study. 
Apologists  for  cartels are  likely  as  not to  state the case 
for  industrial  concentration as  the raison  d' etre  for  cartel 
agreements.  This,  of  course,  is  sheer  fancy.  The  case 
for concentration, particularly in heavy industry, is  evident 
in  the demands technical progress  makes  upon producers. 
In the last few decades, technical advance (such as  the con-
tinuous  strip  mill  in  steelmaking)  frequently  has  forced 
smaller firms  to  concentrate in  order to mobilize necessary 
investment  capital  for  new  equipment.  In turn, the new 
equipment tends to make it uneconomic for  plants produc-
ing all kinds of steel to maintain an output of under a mil-
lion tons. 
Producers of specialized  steels who  today have  to  make 
formidable  investments,  understandably  try  to  diminish 
capital · risks  by  ensuring  outlets  through  various  forms 
of  concentration  involving  transforming  industries. 
These have been some of  the main forces bringing about 
numerous postwar  mergers  which  have,  for  instance,  con-
siderably altered the structure of the French steel industry, 
in  which  six  combines,  with  an  average  capacity  of 
1,500,000  tons  each,  now  control  65  per  cent  of  the 
nation's steel  capacity.  The same  tendencies  exist  in  the 
Ruhr but requests for  concentration so  far  received by  the 
High Authority would not, in  practice, greatly change the 
pattern of competition  there. 
Mannesmann, one of the Ruhr's leading industrial firms, 
has  concentrated  its  holdings,  amounting  to  an  annual 
capacity  of about  1.2) million  tons  of  steel  and some  six 
million tons of coal.  Under tl1e  Allies,  the mines and the 
steel  company of  Mannesmann had  been  linked  together 
by  15-year  contracts  amounting  to  virtual  concentration 
in  the  classic  manner  of  the  verticle  Ruhr combines  be-
tween  coal  and steel  trusts. 
The  Phoenixhiitte,  a  steel-producing  firm,  and  the 
Rheinrohren  works  producing steel  tubing, are  two  of  18 
component  plants  of  the  giant  prewar  combine  Verei-
nigtc  Stahlwerke.  These two  firms  are  now  merging.  Ac-
tually  they  had,  under  Allied  supervision,  already  com-
bined  their  management  boards.  The  High  Authority, 
in  examining  the  situation,  found  that there  was  no  oc-
casion  to  authorize  or  not  authorize  concentration  since 
the two  firms  had,  in  fact,  already  amalgamated and that 
this step did not endanger steel competition. 
Another concentration authorized  in  the Ruhr is  quite 
different.  The biggest German coal mine, Hibernia, which 
is  state-owned  (capacity  11  million  tons)  and  a  small 
'' In  principle,  the  High  Authority  does  not  publish  its  deci-
sions  on  mergers  because  of  the possibility  that  they  will  affect 
the  stock  market.  Usually,  however,  firms  themselves  disclose 
their  intentions  to  concentrate,  as  in  the  cases  mentioned  in 
this article. 
3 4  neighboring  mine  producing  one  million  tons  annually 
have combined. The neighboring mine had coke ovens but 
its  coking coal  was  exhausted.  By  extending  its  galleries 
underground  into  Hibernia's  seams,  it  could  obtain  the 
coking coal  it wanted with a saving of many  million  dol-
lars of investment. 
Common Market Induces 
Concentrations 
The common  market  has  itself  been  a  spur  to  concen-
tration.  Some  concentrations  are  "supranational"  now 
that export restrictions are  gone.  For instance, a  French 
steel group, Sidechar, has bought interests  in  the Harpner 
mines  in  the  Ruhr,  which  formerly  belonged  to  the  de-
cartelized  German  Flick  combine.  Italian  steel  interests 
are also buying into German coal mines to help ensure raw 
materials  supplies.  Previously,  partial  ownership  had  not 
guaranteed  for  a  foreign  owner  that  export  restrictions 
would  not  prevent  delivery. 
Other concentrations are  due  to  the new  trading  situa-
tion brought about by the Community.  A clear  case  au-
thorized  by  the  High  Authority  is  the  Ateliers  et Forges 
de  la  Loire, a new group of special steel producers in  cen-
tral  France.  This  group  came  into  being  to  ensure  the 
survival  of member firms  against  the sharper competition 
of the common market.  (See Bulletin Vol. II, No.4, "New 
Deal  for  French  Steel") 
The  prospect  of  greater  competition  may  also  have 
speeded  the Community's first  case  of a concentration be-
tween  big  steel  producers:  John  Cockerill  and  Ougree-
Marihaye  in  Belgium.  Their principal  plants  stand  next 
to  each  other beside  the  river  Meuse  near  Liege.  The 
firms  have asked  permission to merge, claiming their need 
to  rationalize  production  and  save  heavy  investment  ex-
penditures.  Their combined capacity amounts to two  mil-
lion  tons.  As  each  is  controlled  by  a  holding  company, 
the  request  for  merger  is  being  studied  by  the  High  Au-
thority  to  examine  the  indirect  effects  of  the  concentra-
tion  in  developing  a  privileged  position  for  the  whole 
group.  (Belgian  concentrations authorized  so  far  include 
a steel firm  with two  small transforming plants and a steel 
plant with a small  neighboring iron ore mine.) 
Cartels 
Views  toward  international  cartels  have  changed  Yastly 
between two  wars.  In  1926,  when  the  first  international 
steel  cartel  was  formed  in  Europe,  its  openly-avowed  ob-
jectives  were  to limit competition in  international markets 
and restrict domestic steel production.  It is  interesting to 
note  that at the time, a  wide  range  of public and official 
opinion  in  Europe  and  the  United  States  gravely  sanc-
tioned the new cartel as  a great step forward  in the direc-
tion  of European economic stability.  A little more  than 
a decade  later it had grown  into a world  cartel maintain-
ing  jurisdiction  over  about  90  per  cent  of  the  world's 
iron and steel trade. 
By  1945  it was  clear  that world  opinion  had  changed 
in  its  view  of  cartels.  The  Potsdam  Agreement  under-
lined the dangers of "excessive concentrations of economic 
power"  as  the  result  of  the  lesson  learned  in  Germany. 
Thus,  Allied  policy  against  cartels  in  Germany  following 
the war  was  guided  by  these  objectives: 
"To stimulate  efficiency  and  productivity  by  the  crea-
tion of competitive conditions", and to prohibit "excessive 
concentrations of German economic power, whether within 
or without Germany and whatever their form or chara~ter" 
and  to  prohibit  "German  participation  in  any  cartel  or 
other activity which  had "the purpose of the effect of  re-
straining  international  trade  or  other  economic  activity". 
Today  cartels  are  clearly  and  specifically  outlawed  on 
the common market and menaced by  severe  penalties.  A 
common market uncontrolled by  the High Authority  cer-
tainly would have encouraged a "supranational" steel cartel. 
But no  new  cartel  has  come  into  being  on  the  common 
market  though  there  is  little  doubt  that  prices  are  still 
being fixed  after informal consultations between producers. 
The evidence  of  the recession  of  19 53  was' that the re-
sulting price coordination broke down when demand slack-
ened.  The opening of the frontiers in the coh1mon market 
led,  when  demand  reached  its  lowest  point  in  January, 
19 54,  to considerable competition in the consumer's favor. 
A  similar  conclusion  can  be  applied  to  the  "Brussels 
Entente", or  so-called  "export cartel",  to  which  the  Bel-
gian, Luxembourg, French, and German producers belong. 
Though the High Authority has relatively few direct powers 
over the export market, the inability of the producers inside 
the common market to  fix  quotas  or  impose  penalties  on 
violators of the agreements without flouting the High Au-
thority has  made it hard for  the agreements  to be  turned 
into an effective organization.  The Entente seems to have 
submitted to and not initiated changes in export prices; in-
vestigations,  for  instance,  into  the pricing  of  Community 
exports to Denmark have not unearthed inequitable pricing 
to any significant extent. 
One of  the  principal  practical  effects  of  the  Commu-
nity may well be that it is  preventing the growth of an or-
ganized  European  steel  cartel  and  the  restoration  of  the 
prewar pattern of industrial relations. 
Agreements Unearthed 
The  High  Authority  undertook  its  first  action  against 
cartels  in  July,  1953.  At  the  time,  it  issued  a  decision 
enforcing  prohibitions laid  down  in  the anti-cartel  article 
of  the Treaty,  Article  65.  This  decision  compelled  pro-
ducers  to  bring  agreements  into  the  open  and  to  apply 
for authorization.  Non-compliance by September 1,  1953, 
made the agreements  void.  Seventy-one  applications  for 
authorization were received  of which thirty-nine remain to 
be dealt with. 
Those  already  dealt  with  involved  minor  joint  selling 
agreements as  for  instance within each of the minor Ger-
man coal fields of Aachen and Lower Saxony and the lignite 
field  of  Helmstedt.  Another  case  involved  the  joint sale 
by  Belgian  steel  plants  of  their  rolled  steel  products, amounting  to  three  per  cent  of  the  common  market 
production,  too  little  to  enable  the  firms  to  determine 
prices  or  restrict distribution. 
Essentially,  these  agreement  involve  the  use  by  small 
firms  of sales  organizations developed by bigger  neighbors 
in  cases  where it would be too costly  to build up separate 
outlets.  These agreements  are  not considered  important. 
In a  few  cases,  small  national  cartels,  recognizing  they 
had no  power to subsist on the common market, dissolved 
of their own  accord  when  it was  opened.  Likewise  some 
semi-official agencies, such as  the Dutch State Coal Office, 
were  dissolved  by  their governments. 
In  other  cases,  the  High  Authority  has  taken  action. 
Back in  19 53  it required  the ending of  the national  pur-
chasing and distributing agencies for  scrap iron  in  France, 
Germany and Italy.  In July,  19 53,  it issued  a cease-and-
desist order with regard  to illegal  practices of a large coal-
selling  organization  in  Southern Germany  that had been 
restricting the market. 
Last January it requested the Luxembourg Government 
to modify the statutes setting up the State Coal Importing 
Office  which  though  not  a  cartel,  is  considered  incom-
patible with the common market.  The Luxembourg Gov-
ernment is  appealing to  the  Court of  Justice  against  the 
High Authority's claim that the Office is allocating Luxem-
bourg  coal  supplies. 
However,  the  High  Authority  clearly  recognizes  that 
these  individual  actions,  though  important in  developing 
policy,  are  merely marginal  to  the central  problem.  The 
main anti-cartel action by the executive body still has to be 
launched. 
Coal Cartels 
The  problem  of  the  coal  cartels  is  most  urgent  and 
the High Authority considers it a priority issue.  The com-
mon  market  for  coal  patently  is  dominated  today  by 
national  sales  and buying monopolies. 
In the Ruhr, which produces half the Community's coal 
and up to o/r;ths of its coke, six sales agencies are controlled 
by  an over-all  agency  known  as  the Gemeinschafts-organi-
zation  Ruhrkohle-more  commonly  referred  to  as  the 
"GEORG".  The effect is  that the six have the same price 
lists  and  the same  sales  policy  and  in  many  places,  even 
the same sales  agent. 
In  France,  the  agency  set  up  by  the  government,  the 
Technical Association of Coal Importers, the ATIC, enjoys 
a complete monopoly of the purchase of imports on behalf 
of a number of regional importers' cartels. 
The High Authority must now  strip these and counter-
part organizations like  the Belgian "COBECHAR" of the 
power  they have  acquired  to  influence  prices  and allocate 
sales.  Until they have  been divested  of  these  powers  the 
common  market  cannot  guarantee  consumers  free  access 
to supplies. 
Discussions are  now in progress  over  the transformation 
of the coal cartels in accordance with community law.  The 
talks  are  at the substantive stage  and  the High Authority 
is  in  contact not only  with  the  coal  producers,  but with 
trade  unions,  consuming  industries,  and  governments  of 
the  member states. 
In  coming  months coal  organizations  on  the  common 
market will  have  to be modified.  Even  if  they  transform 
themselves, they will still have to request the High Author-
ity's authorization for  a revised set-up. 
When  the  High  Authority  has  dealt  with  the  coal 
cartels, it will have to tackle those governing other products 
of the  common  market.  Its  aim  is  to  eliminate  existing 
illicit  market  practices  before  the end of  the official  five-
year  transitional  period  of  the  Community  thereby  con-
firming  new  forces  of  competition already  released by  the 
common market.  When the power of the cartels to restrict 
that  competition  has  been  broken,  the  common  market 
will  correspond  to  the  true  competitive  market  system 
envisaged by the creators of the Community. 
The  High  Authority's  role  in  this  field  will  then  be 
that of the watchdog of  the market-the task  cut out for 
it by  the Treaty.  It will,  above  all,  have  to  prevent  the 
recurrence of the cartels in periods of diminishing demand. 
STEEL  CONCENTRATION  IN  THE  U.S.  AND  THE  COMMUNITY 
Share  of  U.S. 
Steel  Firms 
1954  Production 
88,311,652 
tons 
How  U.S.  and  Community  Steel  Production  pies  are  cut 
Share  of  Community 
Steel  Firms 
1954  Production 
43,782,000 
metric  tons 
Out of a  total of 85  U.  S.  steel forms,  three organi· 
zations  produced  54  per  cent  of  all  U.  S.  ingot 
output  while  in  the  Community,  out  of a  total  of 
250 forms,  the three  largest  produced  10 per cent 
of the annual output and  15  forms  turned  out ap· 
proximately  50  per  cent  of  the  Community  ingot 
production. 
5 6  DUTCB  GOVERNMENT  I.OSES  COURT  CASE 
The  Community's  federal 
Court  of  Justice  recently 
handed down  a ;udgment re-
;ecting  an  appeal  by  the 
Dutch  Government  against 
the High  Authority.  Follow-
ing  is  a brief abstract  of that 
iudgment  for  readers  inter-
ested in comparative constitu-
tional  law. 
Court President 
Massimo  Pillotti  presiding 
at  appeals  hearing 
THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  KINGDOM  OF  THE  NETHERLANDS 
V.  THE  HIGH  AUTHORITY  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COAL  AND 
STEEL  COMMUNITY 
This case, which was decided on March 18,  19 55,  involved 
the validity of three decisions made by  the High Authority 
in  March,  1954,  Nos.  18/ 54,  19/ 54,  and  20/ 54.  Those 
decisions  had  maintained  in  effect,  for  two  major  coal 
fields  in  the Community  (the Ruhr and  the Nord &  Pas-
de-Calais),  the  system  of  ceiling  prices  for  sales  of  coal 
within the single market. 
The  Netherlands  Government  attacked  the  decisions 
on the following  main grounds: 
l. Violation  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  Community,  in 
particular  Article  5  which  directs  the  Community's  institutions 
to  carry  out its  activities  with as  little  administrative  machinery 
as  possible;  the argument here  was  that coal  prices  would  have 
declined  of  their  own  accord,  so  that  the imposition  of  ceilings 
was  unnecessary.  It was  also  contended  that  Article  61,  the 
price-control  article,  had  been  violated  because  the  decisions 
had  operated  within  an  existing  and  as  yet  undisturbed  frame-
work  of  market  organizations  (the  coal  sales  organizations) 
which  were  themselves  illegal  under the Treaty. 
2.  Abuse  of  power.  The  argument  here  was  that  the  High 
Authority  had  used  its  price-control  powers,  not  to  alleviate 
a  situation  of  unduly  high  price,  but  to  remedy  a  different 
condition  for  which  different  techniques  were  authorized  in 
the Treaty, namely,  the  control  of  the  market  by  the  coal  sales 
organizations.  The  Dutch  Government  pointed  out  that  the 
ceilings  actually  fixed  by  the  decisions  were  not  much  lower 
than  prevailing  prices  previously  listed  by  the  coal  producers, 
which,  it  contended,  proved  that  price  control  was  not  the 
real  objective  of  the  decisions. 
3.  Major violations  of  procedure,  in  that  the  High  Authority 
allegedly  had  failed  to  accompany  its  decisions  with  a  proper 
statement  of  the  reasons  therefor  as  required  by  article  15  of 
the Treaty. 
The Court of  Justice  rejected  the Dutch Government's 
petition  on all  points  and  taxed  costs  against  the  Dutch 
Government.  It disposed  briefly  of  the  issue  of  major 
violations  of procedure,  finding  that the preambles to  the 
decisions  lnd  contained  adequate  recitals  of  necessary 
advance  consultation and of  the ends  to  be  served  by  the 
maintenance  of  coal  price  ceilings  in  some  (though  not 
all)  areas  of  the Community. 
On the issue of violation of the Treaty, the Court noted 
that by virtue of the anti-trust provisions of the Treaty and 
certain  articles  in  the  protocol  containing  the  transitory 
provisions,  the  High  Authority  had  a  certain  administra-
tive  flexibility  in  dealing  with  the  agreements  and  con-
centrations which  in  the view  of  the Dutch Government 
violated the antitrust provisions, but that there was  nothing 
inconsistent  with  the  Treaty  in  using  price  controls  to 
counter any untoward effects produced on the single market 
by  these agreements and concentrations. 
Perhaps  the most interesting portion of  the opinion  is 
the Court's construction of Article 3  3 of the Treaty, which 
limits the Court's review of the High Authority's appraisal 
of  the situation  before  it,  "based  on  economic  facts  and 
circumstances, which led to ... decisions or recommenda-
tions", to those  cases  where  the High Authority is  alleged 
to have abused its powers  or  to have been guilty of a clear 
misinterpretation,  meconnaissance  patente,  of  the  pro-
visions  of  the  Treaty or  of a  rule  of  law  relating  to  the 
application  of  the  Treaty.  The  Dutch  Government 
appears  to  have  contended  that the  Court should  find  a 
clear  misinterpretation  of  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
and should  reject  the High  Authority's  evaluation  of  the 
situation for two reasons: first, that the setting of maximum 
prices  had  in  fact  frozen  prevailing  prices  at  the ceiling; 
second,  that the only dangers  to  production and full  em-
ployment  at  the  time  of  the  High  Authority's  decisions 
were  dangers  which  should have been averted  if  at all  by 
setting  minimum  prices  rather  than  maximum  prices. 
(The  Dutch  Government,  whose  citizens  are  predomi-
nantly  consumers  of  coal  rather  than  producers  was  not 
arguing  for  the  imposition  of  minimum  prices  but  was 
alleging that in the current state of the market the setting 
of price ceilings had in effect put a floor under the market.) 
The  Court agreed  that  it  had  jurisdiction  to  consider 
whether  there  had  been  a  manifest  misinterpretation  of 
the Treaty, but in  proceeding  to  its  consideration it exer-
cised a kind  of  self-restraint which  will  be familiar  to stu-
dents  of  modern  American  constitutional  law.  It  said 
that the  misinterpretation  would  have  to  appear  to  flow 
from  an  obvious  error  in  appraisal  of  the  situation  and 
found  that such  an  obvious  error  did  not exist.  It  had 
been  stipulated  that  some  prices,  on  being  freed  from 
ceilings,  had  actually  risen,  and  the  Court laid  stress  on 
this  to  show that it did not a priori appear that there was 
no  necessity  for  the  regulatory  action  taken  by  the  High 
Authority. 
Finally,  the  High  Authority  rejected  the  contention 
based  on abuse  of  power,  relying  on the record  of  delib-
erations  in  the Consultative  Committee and  the  Council 
of  Ministers  that  took  place  before  the  decisions  were 
promulgated  and stating  that  the  disturbing  situation  in 
the  field  of  coal  prices  that faced  the  High  Authority  at 
the  time  it  made  its  decisions  could  well  have  justified 
its  actions. i 
PROGRESS REPORT: bal'eaacl'acy vel'sas lhe co••oa •al'kel 
Bureaucracy  takes  its  toll  upon the common market with 
picayune  and  sometimes  invisible  obstacles  to  trade  be-
tween Community nations. After major barriers fell,  many 
so-called  "administrative obstacles"  to  the complete func-
tioning of a single market for  coal and steel still remained 
to  plague and  delay  trade across  frontiers.  As  a  result  it 
is  still harder to  sell across a frontier than inside a national 
territory, even  though the fundamental barriers have gone. 
Now the High Authority, together with the governments 
of member nations, is  attempting to  clear away  these trip 
wires to trade.  The obstacles are many and varied.  There 
are,  first  of all,  export and  import licenses.  Governments 
are  required by  the Treaty to grant licenses  automatically 
to  Community shippers.  But administrative red tape may 
hold  up  the  granting  of  licenses  so  that,  as  French  pro-
ducers  complained  in  19 53  when  competition  was  high, 
delays  result in  the loss  of  contracts. 
In  some  cases,  administrative  costs  have  had  to  be 
reimbursed to  government agencies by producers or buyers 
shipping Community goods across a frontier.  A "statistical 
tax" of one per cent, for  instance, existed in one Commu-
nity country; another still levies a Y2  per cent administrative 
tax on all in-coming goods, including Community products. 
Finally,  the spectre  of  bureaucracy,  paper  work,  shows 
itself  at  every  frontier,  where  separate  declarations  must 
be prepared for  customs officers  on either side. 
The Treaty gives  the High Authority no direct power to 
eliminate these obstacles.  Nevertheless, last year,  using in-
formation  supplied  by  Community  producers,  the  High 
Authority  began  discussions  with  member  states  on  ways 
and  means  of  simplifying  administrative  procedures  and 
ending obstacles. 
First of all,  the  High  Authority  proposed  that export-
import licensing be halted since granting of licenses implied 
that  governments  still  have  a  right  of  control  over  the 
delivery  of goods  through the common market.  A simple 
declaration  form  containing  only  information  needed  by 
national statistical and exchange bureaus was recommended 
as  a  substitute.  As  a  result,  licensing  orders  that can  be 
removed at this  time, except for  France, already are being 
eliminated  and  the  ending  of  others  is  under  study.* 
Similarly,  only  a  few  of  the extra  administrative  costs  of 
routing  coal,  ore,  scrap,  and  steel  across  a  frontier  still 
subsist  and  governments  responsible  for  them  are  being 
pressed  for  their  removal. 
There still remains the paperwork complaint-the exces-
sive  number  of  forms,  applications,  and  declarations  in 
triplicate  and  quintuplicate-which  have  to  be  filled  in 
for  the  customs  at  every  frontier.  It is  understandable 
that Community goods  still  must be declared  to  customs 
* Treaty  provisions  for  the  transitional  period  of  five  years 
before  the full  opening of  the common  market imply  in  certain 
cases  that governments may reserve  their right to license the sale 
of  coal,  iron,  scrap  and  steel,  particularly  those  imported  from 
third  countries  during  that time. 
authorities  if  only  to  differentiate  them  from  goods  on 
which  duties  apply.  But  the  High  Authority  aims  at 
persuading member countries to  simplify the procedure by 
adopting  a  single  customs  declaration  which  would  be 
valid  throughout the Community.  A commission already 
examining  the  question  has  uncovered  many  legal  and 
practical  problems.  A  satisfactory  solution  is  expected 
only after considerable  negotiation and discussion. 
If the High Authority's goal is reached, shippers of goods 
across Community frontiers ultimately will have to produce 
only  two  basic  documents:  a  customs  declaration  valid 
throughout the common market, and a declaration  in lieu 
of  a  license.  The results,  say  proponents,  will  include  a 
saving  in  time,  effort,  money,  and  probably  not least,  in 
the patience of  shippers. 
With  no  real  power  to  engage  in  war  against  this 
form  of  red  tape,  the  High  Authority  has  had  to  work 
toward  removing  administrative  obstacles  on  a  piecemeal 
basis,  depending partly  upon  the  cooperation  of  member 
nations.  The success  of  steps  already  taken leads  observ-
ers to  believe that all  such obstacles still remaining can be 
cleared  away.  If so,  the success  of  the operation  will  be 
another example  of  the High  Authority's  ability,  because 
it is  the executive  of the  Community, to  win  reforms  m 
areas over which it has no precise mandate. 
NEW SCRAP  CONTROLS 
The High Authority has reacted to  the threat of a scrap 
shortage  in  the  Community  by  instituting  new  con-
trols  on scrap  imported into the common market. 
The  executive  body  decided,  on  March  26th,  in 
agreement with  the Council  of  Ministers,  to  reinforce 
Community  powers  over  the  distribution  of  imported 
scrap without imposing controls upon scrap trade within 
the  common  market  itself.  (See  "Scrap  in  the  Steel 
Boom", Bulletin #  5.) 
The new control system  (which assumes that imports 
will  be sufficient in  the coming months for  supply and 
effective  demand  to  balance out)  will  remain  in  force 
until March 31,  19 56,  and will  include these new pow-
ers: 
1), Greater High Authority supervision of the Com-
munity Scrap Consumers' office  in Brussels  which coor-
dinates  purchases  by  Community  consumers  on  the 
international  market.  The  High  Authority  will  have 
a  permanent  delegate  on  the  executive  board  with 
powers  to  summon  the board and to  act for  it if  it is 
unable to  reach  unanimous decisions on imports policy. 
2).  The  office  may  now  buy  in  order  to  build  up 
stocks  (not more  than  20  to  30  per  cent of  total  im-
ports).  Hitherto,  the  office  simply  acted  as  a  channel 
for  Community buyers  purchasing scrap  abroad. 
3). The office  will  have  powers  to  divert  ships  still 
at sea  to  ports  nearest  the regions  in  the Community 
areas  where scrap shortages are  most acute. 
The  High  Authority  has  declared  that if  the  above 
measures prove insufficient in changing scrap conditions, 
the  Council  of  Ministers  would  immediately  be  con-
sulted  on  future  action. 
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THE MINEN'S OUTPUT
GOES UP
The last two weeks in February,  1955, for the first time
since the war, the average output of each miner under-
ground in Communiw  coal mines climbed to more than
1.5 tons per shift. The increase, however, was still not
enough to top the prewar (1939) mark of nearly 1.6
metric tons per-man-shift.
The natural process of time in the Netherlands and
in Germany  also has contributed to this decline. More-
over, in the Ruhr in particular, the need to produce coal
in large quantities  during and after the rvar, coupled with
the difficulty of finding enough capital to sink new shafts,
has resulted in the impoverishment of the best seams under
exploitation.  Since the u'ar, continuing housing shortages
and the high turnover  of labor, in Belgium and Germany
especially, have retarded development.
But today steadv progress is being made, especially in
France and the Saar u'here, under management of the
French national coal board, the individual miner's pro-
duction has risen b1' 30 per cent over prewar levels. In-
creases in these areas have been largely due to heavy new
investments.  In the Ruhr and Belgium,  however, produc-
tion is rising more slowly.
Comparisons  between American and European coal
production figures are likely to mislead because of widely
varying mine conditions. In the United States, many
collieries are "opencast" mines or mines exploiting  rich,
shallow seams. Most Community  miners go down over
3,000 feet into the earth to work sparse and difficult
seams-the penalty of exploiting the same resource for
centuries.
Britain's mining conditions  are more comparable to
those in the Community and output is higher, though
before the war it rvas lorver. Today the British miner
produces a ton of coal in a little over 41/z hours. The
Saar miner gets out the same amount in less than 4 hours
but the French, German, and the Dutch miner need
between 4Vz and 4)/+ hours, while the Belgian requires
almost seven hours. Today's figures, holet'er, show that
the Community miner's productivity  is rising at a faster
rate than in Britain.
The policy maintained by the High Authority is, of
course, to push productivity in Community coal mines.
Thus, the Export-Import Bank loan is being devoted
almost entirely to improving colliery installations,  building
pithead power stations to transform low-grade coals into
much'needed electricity, and to speed conshuction of
miners' housing. By 1957-58, the High Authority expects
the Community miner's output to reach its Prewar
average of 1.6 tons and to be well under way with its pro-
gram to build 100,000 miners' homes. As small as the
productivity increase seems, Community mining specialists
say that because of the shortage of skilled miners and the
thinning-out  of high-yield seams, it will be accomplished
only by a change in European  mining techniques and a
big increase in the mechanical  efficiency of extraction in
the mines.
FNENGH STEELMITKEN
GNITIGIZES GOMMUNITY
Pierre Ricard, President of the French Iron and Steel
Federation, recently criticized the European Coal and
Steel Community  and its first High Authority President,
fean Monnet, in a speech before the Anglo-American
Press Association in Paris. The French steel leader also
expressed  his opposition to proposals  to extend the scope
of the Community  to other fields such as an arms pool
or energy production. As reported in The New York
Times, he castigated  fellow countryman  fean Monnet  for
seeming to have paid less attention to coal and steel aftairs
than to the European  Defense Community  Plan and to
the further integration  of Europe. While conceding some
benefits from the Community to the steel industry,
M. Ricard specified that barriers to French steel produc-
tion still existing included the absence of currency  con-
vertibility, differences in transport  cost and in national
social security benefits, the French Government's fixed
prices for finished steel, and the lack of a Moselle River
canal for cheaper transport of coke from the Ruhr. None
of M. Ricard's specified  complaints  are affairs that can be
controlled  by the Community except transport rates which
are now undergoing  a drastic change. The other "barriers"
come under the authority of national governments.
Coal, Raw Steel and lron Ore Production
(per rq. rnile ond per heod of poputotion)
Pennrylvonio i